Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006

Title I: United States And India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation - Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 - (Sec. 102) Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the means to deliver them are critical objectives for U.S. foreign policy; (2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and strengthening its implementation, particularly verification and compliance, is the keystone of U.S. nonproliferation policy; and (3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable international security situation. Declares the sense of Congress that: (1) strong bilateral relations with India are in the U.S. national interest; (2) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people of all countries; (3) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races; and (4) the United States should not seek to facilitate the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under U.S. law. (Sec. 103) States that it is U.S. policy to: (1) oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT; (2) encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as applying only to the extent consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities; and (3) seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or terminated. States that it is U.S. Policy to: (1) achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China; (2) achieve the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India become parties; (3) secure India's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and commitment to its Statement of Interdiction Principles; and (4) secure India's ratification of accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997. States that it is U.S. Policy to ensure that: (1) any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol to which India is a party with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment; and (2) the text and implementation of any agreement for cooperation with India meet specified requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA). States that it is U.S. Policy to: (1) secure India's participation in U.S. efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including the means to deliver them; (2) seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and promote their reduction and eventual elimination; and (13) ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant to certain congressional review procedures. Declares it is U.S. Policythat any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements. (Sec. 104) Authorizes the President, upon making specified determinations, to: (1) exempt a proposed cooperation agreement with India from AEA requirements for maintenance of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities; (2) waive a certain additional export criterion and procedures; and (3) waive mandatory termination of nuclear exports based upon specified conduct that occurred before July 18, 2005. Includes among the determinations conditioning such waivers that: (1) India is taking necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology; and (2) the NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by NSG guidelines. Requires the President's report to congressional committees on such determinations to include a summary of: (1) the plan provided by India to the United States and the IAEA to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the declaration identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards; and (2) the agreement entered into between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards to India's civil nuclear facilities, together with a description of the progress toward full implementation as well as toward conclusion and implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA. Requires the report to describe steps taken by India to: (1) work with the United States for a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; (2) prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology; (3) secure materials and technology applicable for the development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them through the application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and through harmonization with and adherence to specified international guidelines, compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative; and (4) ensure that U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India will not in any way assist India's nuclear weapons program. Sets forth restrictions on nuclear transfers. Sets conditions for: (1) termination of nuclear transfers to India; (2) exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers to India regarding enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production; and (3) a nuclear export accountability program. States that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may only issue licenses for the export or reexport to India of any equipment, components, or materials related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water if specified requirements are met. Permits approval of such exports or reexports only if: (1) the end user is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities, or is a facility participating in, and the export or reexport is associated with, a bilateral or multinational program to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle; (2) measures are in place to ensure that no sensitive nuclear technology will be diverted to persons, facilities, or programs not under IAEA safeguards; and (3) the President determines that the export or reexport will not improve India's military ability to produce nuclear weapons or fissile material. Directs the President to ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India and to ensure U.S. compliance with Article I of the NPT. Includes among such measures: (1) obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions pursuant to the export licensing authorities of the NRC and the Department of Commerce and the authorizing authorities of the Department of Energy (DOE); (2) a reporting and accounting system for technology transfers, including any retransfers in India, authorized by the DOE pursuant to the AEA; and (3) alternate safeguards conforming with IAEA standards and practices in the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards required by a U.S.-India agreement. States that such measures shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances of recipient compliance with the requirements of any U.S.-issued licenses regarding such exports (including those relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, and storage of such exports). Requires the President to submit to Congress: (1) specified information on India's nuclear activities; (2) an annual implementation and compliance report, including an analysis of whether U.S. Civil nuclear cooperation with India assists India's nuclear weapons program; and (3) a detailed description of progress toward India's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and formal commitment to its Statement of Interdiction Principles. (Sec. 105) States that this Act does not constitute authority for any action in violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT. (Sec. 106) States that if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act, any waiver made under this Act shall cease to be effective. (Sec. 107) States that Congress finds that India is not a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) adherent for certain prohibitions and sanction purposes of the Arms Export Control Act. (Subjects India to such prohibitions and sanctions relating to transfer to it, by foreign persons, of missile equipment or technology.) (Sec. 109) Authorizes the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, to establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program to pursue jointly with scientists from the United States and India a program to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals. Authorizes appropriations for FY2007-FY2011. Title II: United States Additional Protocol Implementation - United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act - (Sec. 203) Defines "Additional Protocol" (when used in the singular form) as the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna on June 12, 1998. Subtitle A: General Provisions - (Sec. 211) Authorizes the President to carry out this title and the Additional Protocol and directs the President to designate the enforcing executive agency or agencies. States that such authority does not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority of any federal department or agency already having such authority. Subtitle B: Complementary Access - (Sec. 221) States that no complementary access to any U.S. location shall take place pursuant to the Additional Protocol without U.S. government authorization. Authorizes such access. Declares that, in the event of complementary access to a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration, or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the Department of Labor may participate in the access. (Sec. 222) Sets forth complementary access procedures regarding: (1) notice; (2) credentials; (3) scope of access; and (4) environment, health, safety, and security observance. (Sec. 223) Sets forth provisions for: (1) location owner, operator, or occupant consent; (2) administrative search warrants in the absence of consent; (3) expedited access; and (4) administrative search warrants for complementary access. (Sec. 224) Makes it unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse to permit, or to disrupt or otherwise impede, a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in connection with such access. Subtitle C: Confidentiality of Information - (Sec. 231) Exempts from specified disclosure requirements any information acquired by the U.S. Government under this title or under the Additional Protocol. Subtitle D: Enforcement - (Sec. 241) Makes it unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to: (1) establish or maintain any record required under this title; (2) submit any report, notice, or other information to the U.S. Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed under this title; or (3) permit access to or copying of any record by the U.S. Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed under this title. (Sec. 242) Establishes civil and criminal penalties for complementary access and recordkeeping violations. Provides for administrative appellate and judicial review. (Sec. 243) States that U.S. district courts shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head of an executive agency to: (1) restrain complementary access and recordkeeping violations; or (2) to compel the taking of any action required by this title or the Additional Protocol. Subtitle E: Environmental Sampling - (Sec. 251) Directs the President to notify the appropriate congressional committees if the IAEA Board of Governors approves wide-area environmental sampling for use as a safeguards verification tool. (Sec. 252) Prohibits IAEA-proposed wide-area environmental sampling at a specified U.S. Location under the Additional Protocol unless the President reports to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) such sampling is necessary to increase IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon state party; (2) such sampling will not result in IAEA access to locations, activities, or information of direct national security significance; and (3) the United States has been provided sufficient opportunity for consultation with the IAEA or has requested that the IAEA engage in such access and sampling. (Sec. 253) Prohibits the United States from permitting any location-specific environmental sampling in the United States unless the President reports to the appropriate congressional committees that such conditions have been met. Subtitle F: Protection of National Security Information and Activities - (Sec. 261) Provides that no current or former Department of Defense or DOE location, site, or facility of direct national security significance shall be subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol. Prohibits provision under the Additional Protocol of any information of direct national security significance regarding any such location, site, or facility associated with activities of the Department of Defense or the DOE. Declares that this title shall not be construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, including in particular specified "Restricted Data." Prohibits construction of this Act to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of national security and other classified information. (Sec. 262) Declares that no national of a country whose government supports acts of international terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to carry out an inspection activity under the Additional Protocol or a related safeguards agreement. Requires IAEA inspectors to be accompanied at all times by federal personnel when inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the United States under the Additional Protocol. Instructs the President to conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments at least every five years to ensure that information of direct national security significance remains protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol. Subtitle G: Reports - (Sec. 271) Instructs the President to submit to Congress: (1) a list of the sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States (USSLFAs) that the President intends to declare to the IAEA; (2) a list of any USSLFAs the President intends to add to or remove from the declaration; (3) a report certifying that each USSLFA on the list has been examined by each agency with related national security equities; and (4) a report on efforts to promote implementation of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon state parties, U.S. assistance to the IAEA to promote the effective implementation of such additional protocols, and the verification of the compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations. (Sec. 275) Directs the President to notify Congress of any notifications issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the Additional Protocol. Subtitle H: Authorization of Appropriations - (Sec. 281) Authorizes appropriations.

Title I: United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation - United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act - (Sec. 102) Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) strong bilateral relations with India are in the U.S. national interest; (2) the United States and India share common democratic values and the potential for increasing economic engagement; (3) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people of all countries; (4) such commerce also represents a significant change in U.S. policy with countries not parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); (5) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes India's adherence to international nonproliferation regimes; and (6) the United States should not seek to facilitate the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under U.S. law. (Sec. 103) States as U.S. policy the following: (1) to end the production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (2) to achieve the government of India's cooperation in the full range of international nonproliferation regimes and activities; (3) to ensure India's compliance with arms control agreements and ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol thereto to which India is a party with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment; (4) to meet specified requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA); (5) to act in a manner consistent with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology developed by the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); (6) to work with NSG members to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies; (7) to maintain international compliance with NPT; and (8) to ensure that exports of nuclear fuel to India do not contribute to increases in India's production of fissile material for non-civilian purposes. (Sec. 104) Authorizes the President, upon making specified determinations, and making available to the appropriate congressional committees the text of an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear facilities, programs, and materials, to exempt a proposed cooperation agreement with India from AEA requirements regarding: (1) mandatory maintenance of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities; (2) certain additional export criteria and procedures; (3) failure to take steps after March 10, 1978, to end activities involving source or special nuclear materials related to manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices; and (4) conduct that occurred before July 18, 2005, that would have resulted in termination of nuclear exports. (Sec. 105) Specifies the presidential determinations respecting India and the United States, India and the IAEA, civil nuclear commerce with India, and nonproliferation safeguards which constitute the prerequisites for such exemptions. (Sec. 106) Prohibits the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Secretary of Energy from authorizing licenses for the export or reexport to India of any equipment, materials, or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water. Permits such prohibited exports or reexports if: (1) the end user is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities, or is a facility participating in, and the export or reexport is associated with, a bilateral or multinational program to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle; and (2) the President determines that the export or reexport will not improve India's military ability to produce nuclear weapons or fissile material. (Sec. 107) Directs the President to ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India and to ensure U.S. compliance with Article I of the NPT. Includes among such measures the following: (1) obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions pursuant to the export licensing authorities of the NRC and the Department of Commerce and the authorizing authorities of the Department of Energy (DOE); (2) a reporting and accounting system for technology transfers, including any retransfers in India authorized by the DOE pursuant to the AEA; and (3) alternate safeguards that conform with IAEA standards and practices in the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards required by a U.S.-India agreement. States that such measures shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances of recipient compliance with the requirements of any U.S.-issued licenses regarding such exports (including those relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, and storage of such exports). (Sec. 108) Directs the President to keep the appropriate congressional committees fully informed of any significant nuclear activities of India. Requires the President to report annually to the appropriate congressional committees: (1) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that the government of India has placed or intends to place under IAEA safeguards; (2) a comprehensive listing of each license or other authorization for the export or reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; (3) any significant nuclear commerce between India and other countries; (4) either a certification that India is in full compliance with the commitments contained in the agreements and other documents or, if the President cannot make such certification, an identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising with regard to India's adherence to its commitments; (5) a description of U.S. efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in reducing their fissile material stockpiles; (6) estimates of uranium mined in India and allocated for production of nuclear explosive devices, and estimates of the rate of production in India of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices, as well as the rate of production of such devices; (7) an analysis of whether imported uranium has affected the rate of nuclear explosive device production in India; and (8) a description of efforts made toward achieving India's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative, formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles, public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing such decision. (Sec. 109) States that this title shall not be deemed to constitute authority for any action in violation of any U.S. obligation under the NPT. (Sec. 110) Deems any determination under section 105 and any waiver under section 104 of this Act ineffective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of the Act. (Sec. 111) States that Congress finds that India is not a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) adherent for certain sanction purposes (section 73) of the Arms Export Control Act. (India's violation of missile transfer restrictions remains subject to sanctions.) (Sec. 112) Amends the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999 to specify that the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance has responsibility for verification or compliance aspects of the reports required by this Act. (Sec. 114) Declares it is the policy of the United States that any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements. (Sec. 115) Directs the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, to: (1) establish a cooperative threat reduction program involving scientists from the United States and India to further common nonproliferation goals, with an emphasis on nuclear safeguards; and (2) enter into an agreement with the National Academies to develop recommendations for the implementation of the program. Authorizes appropriations for FY2007-FY2011. Title II: United States Additional Protocol Implementation - United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act - (Sec. 203) Defines "Additional Protocol" (when used in the singular form) as the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna on June 12, 1998. Subtitle A: General Provisions - (Sec. 211) Authorizes the President to carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional Protocol and directs the President to designate the enforcing executive agency or agencies. States that such authority does not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority of any federal department or agency already having such authority. Subtitle B: Complementary Access - (Sec. 221) States that: (1) no complementary access to any U.S. location shall take place pursuant to the Additional Protocol without U.S. government authorization (Authorizes such access); and (2) in the event of complementary access to a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or of the Mine Safety and Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the Department of Labor may participate in the access. (Sec. 222) Sets forth complementary access procedures respecting: (1) notice; (2) credentials; (3) scope of access; and (4) environment, health, safety, and security observance. (Sec. 223) Sets forth provisions respecting: (1) consent; (2) administrative search warrants in the absence of consent; (3) expedited access; and (4) administrative search warrants for complimentary access. (Sec. 224) Makes it unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse to permit, or to disrupt or otherwise impede, a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in connection with such access. Subtitle C: Confidentiality of Information - (Sec. 231) Exempts information acquired by the U.S. government under this title or under the Additional Protocol from specified disclosure provisions. Subtitle D: Enforcement - (Sec. 241) Makes it unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to: (1) establish or maintain any record required under this title; (2) submit any report, notice, or other information to the U.S. Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed under this title; or (3) permit access to or copying of any record by the U.S. Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed under this title. (Sec. 242) Establishes civil and criminal penalties for complementary access and recordkeeping violations. Sets forth administrative appellate and judicial review provisions. (Sec. 243) States that U.S. district courts shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head of an executive agency to: (1) restrain complementary access and recordkeeping violations; or (2) to compel the taking of any action required by this title or the Additional Protocol. Subtitle E: Environmental Sampling - (Sec. 251) Directs the President to notify the appropriate congressional committees if the IAEA Board of Governors approves wide-area environmental sampling for use as a safeguards verification tool. Requires such notification to contain: (1) a description of the specific methods and sampling techniques; (2) a statement whether or not such sampling may be conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; and (3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods and sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine the conduct, type, and nature of nuclear activities. (Sec. 252) Prohibits IAEA-proposed wide-area environmental sampling at a specified U.S. location under the Additional Protocol unless the President reports to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) such sampling is necessary to increase IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon state party; (2) such sampling will not result in IAEA access to locations, activities, or information of direct national security significance; and (3) the United States has been provided sufficient opportunity for consultation with the IAEA or has requested that the IAEA engage in such access and sampling. (Sec. 253) Prohibits the United States from permitting any location-specific environmental sampling in the United States unless the President reports to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in a non-nuclear weapons state; (2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental sampling will not result in IAEA access to locations, activities, or information of direct national security significance; (3) the United States has been provided sufficient opportunity for consultation with the IAEA or has requested that the IAEA engage in such access and sampling. Sets forth a rule of construction for the phrase "necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon state party." Subtitle F: Protection of National Security Information and Activities - (Sec. 261) Provides that no current or former Department of Defense or DOE location, site, or facility of direct national security significance shall be subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol. Prohibits provision under the Additional Protocol of any information of direct national security significance regarding any such location, site, or facility associated with activities of the Department of Defense or the DOE. Declares that this title shall not be construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, including in particular specified "Restricted Data." Prohibits construction of this Act to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of national security and other classified information. (Sec. 262) Declares that no national of a country designated by the Secretary of State as a government supporting acts of international terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to carry out an inspection activity under the Additional Protocol or a related safeguards agreement. Requires IAEA inspectors to be accompanied at all times by federal personnel when inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the United States under the Additional Protocol. Instructs the President to conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments at least every five years to ensure that information of direct national security significance remains protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol. Subtitle G: Reports - (Sec. 271) Instructs the President to submit to Congress: (1) a list of the sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States (USSLFAs) that the President intends to declare to the IAEA; (2) a list of any USSLFAs the President intends to add to or remove from the declaration; (3) a report certifying that each USSLFA on the list has been examined by each agency with related national security equities; and (4) a report on efforts to promote implementation of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon state parties, U.S. assistance to the IAEA to promote the effective implementation of such additional protocols, and the verification of the compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations. (Sec. 275) Directs the President to notify Congress of any notifications issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the Additional Protocol. Subtitle H: Authorization of Appropriations - (Sec. 281) Authorizes appropriations.

Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 - (Sec. 3) Declares the sense of Congress that: (1) it is in the U.S. interest to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) with a country that has never been a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with respect to civilian nuclear technology if certain criteria have been met; (2) India meets such criteria; (3) it is in the U.S. national security interest to deepen its relationship with India across a full range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation; (4) the South Asia region is so important that the United States should continue its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan; and (5) the U.S. government shall not participate in, or contribute to, the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Declares the policy of the United States to oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT. Declares certain U.S. policy objectives with respect to South Asia. Specifies the intention to: (1) seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia, and promote their reduction and eventual elimination; (2) achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China; (3) conclude and implement a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; (4) secure India's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative; (5) obtain India's ratification of or accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; (6) obtain India's participation in U.S. efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction; (7) ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States except according to AEA-required congressional review procedures; and (8) encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium. (Sec. 4) Specifies conditions which the President must determine to exist in order to exercise authority to: (1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India from the AEA requirement that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards be maintained for all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities; (2) waive application to India of the AEA prohibition against U.S. export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology unless such safeguards are maintained; and (3) waive certain AEA export restrictions required because of the detonation of a nuclear explosive device by a non-nuclear-weapon state, and failure to take steps representing sufficient progress toward terminating activities involving source or special nuclear material with direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices. Prescribes procedures for: (1) submission to Congress of information concerning such determinations, including a description of steps taken to ensure that proposed U.S. civil nuclear assistance to India will not assist India's nuclear weapons program; and (2) approval by Congress of a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India. Declares that nothing in this Act, or any related agreement, shall be interpreted as permitting any civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India that would assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or acquire either nuclear weapons or explosive devices. Requires termination of nuclear transfers to India if India makes materially significant transfers of nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology, or of ballistic missiles or related equipment or technology, that do not conform to guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Sets forth procedural prerequisites for a Joint Resolution of Approval by Congress of a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India. Requires the President to report annually to Congress regarding: (1) the extent to which U.S. policy objectives have been achieved; (2) U.S. exports to India, and whether U.S. civil nuclear assistance to India is assisting India's nuclear weapons program; (3) the use by India of U.S. equipment, technology, or nuclear material in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons related complex; (4) new nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities that the government of India has designated as civilian and placed under inspections, or has designated as military; and (5) the disposal of spent nuclear fuel from India's civilian nuclear program. Directs the President to report annually to certain congressional committees on: (1) the effectiveness of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement in achieving the goals and objectives described in this Act; and (2) the relative level of India's nuclear fissile material production compared to the previous year.

United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 - (Sec. 3) Declares the sense of Congress that: (1) it may be in the U.S. interest to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) with a country that has never been a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with respect to civilian nuclear technology if certain criteria have been met; (2) India meets such criteria; and (3) it is in the U.S. national security interest to deepen its relationship with India across a full range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation. Declares the policy of the United States to oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT. Declares certain U.S. policy objectives with respect to South Asia. Specifies the intention to: (1) seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia, and promote their reduction and eventual elimination; (2) achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China; (3) conclude and implement a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; (4) secure India's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative; (5) obtain India's ratification of or accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; (6) obtain India's participation in U.S. efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction; (7) ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States except according to AEA-required congressional review procedures; and (8) encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium. (Sec. 4) Specifies conditions which the President must determine to exist in order to exercise authority to: (1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India from the AEA requirement that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards be maintained for all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities; (2) waive application to India of the AEA prohibition against U.S. export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology unless such safeguards are maintained; and (3) waive certain AEA export restrictions required because of the detonation of a nuclear explosive device by a non-nuclear-weapon state, and failure to take steps representing sufficient progress toward terminating activities involving source or special nuclear material with direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices. Prescribes procedures for: (1) submission to Congress of information concerning such determinations, including a description of steps taken to ensure that proposed United States civil nuclear assistance to India will not assist India's nuclear weapons program; and (2) approval by Congress of a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India. Declares that nothing in this Act, or any related agreement, shall be interpreted as permitting any civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India that would assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or acquire either nuclear weapons or explosive devices. Requires termination of nuclear transfers to India if India makes materially significant transfers of nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology, or of ballistic missiles or related equipment or technology, that do not conform to guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Sets forth procedural prerequisites for congressional approval of a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India. Requires the President to report annually to Congress regarding: (1) the extent to which U.S. policy objectives have been achieved; (2) U.S. exports to India, and whether U.S. civil nuclear assistance to India is assisting India's nuclear weapons program; (3) the use by India of U.S. equipment, technology, or nuclear material in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons related complex; (4) new nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities that the government of India has designated as civilian and placed under inspections, or has designated as military; and (5) the disposal of spent nuclear fuel from India's civilian nuclear program.

United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 - Declares the sense of Congress that: (1) it may be in the U.S. interest to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) with a country that has never been a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with respect to civilian nuclear technology if certain criteria have been met; (2) India meets such criteria; and (3) it is in the U.S. national security interest to deepen its relationship with India across a full range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation. Declares the policy of the United States to oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT. Declares certain U.S. policy objectives with respect to South Asia, including to seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination. Specifies conditions which the President must determine to exist in order to exercise authority to: (1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India from the AEA requirement that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards be maintained for all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities; (2) waive application to India of the AEA prohibition against U.S. export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology unless such safeguards are maintained; and (3) waive certain AEA export restrictions required because of the detonation of a nuclear explosive device by a non-nuclear-weapon state, and failure to take steps representing sufficient progress toward terminating activities involving source or special nuclear material with direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices. Prescribes procedures for: (1) submission to Congress of information concerning such determinations; and (2) approval by Congress of a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India. Requires termination of nuclear transfers to India if India makes materially significant transfers of nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology, or of ballistic missiles or related equipment or technology, that do not conform to guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).