FY2026 NDAA: Active Component EndStrength

Background Under 10 USC § 115(a), Congress sets the maximum size of the active component of the Armed Forces annually, typically in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The active component comprises the full-time personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Space Force. Congress also appropriates funds for the pay and benefits of these personnel. End-strength specifically refers to the actual number of personnel in a branch on the last day of the fiscal year (i.e., September 30). The enacted end-strength figures in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (FY2026 NDAA, P.L. 119-60) are for September 30, 2026. Congress also periodically sets minimum end-strength levels for the Armed Forces, that may be identical to or lower than the authorized end-strength. While Congress authorizes minimum and maximum end-strengths, each military service manages its force, through recruiting and retention efforts, to achieve an actual end-strength. Typically, actual end-strength falls within the congressionally authorized minimum and maximum end-strengths. However, there are circumstances in which the actual end-strength may fall outside the authorized range. For example, under 10 USC § 115(f), the Secretary of Defense (who is now using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) may—after determining “such action is in the national interest”—increase the end-strength of any of the services above the authorized end-strength by up to 3%. Recruiting and retention shortfalls may cause one or more of the services to fall below their minimum authorized strength. Under 10 U.S.C. §113a(b)(2), the Secretary of Defense is required to submit end-strength requests for all branches of the active component in an annual request to Congress. Congress is not bound by these requests but uses them as a point of departure for consideration of end-strength levels. End-Strength Trends, FY2001-FY2026 Congress varies the authorized end-strengths over time in response to factors such as national security priorities, budget constraints, and recruitment challenges. For example, in enacting the FY2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181), Congress authorized reduced Navy and Air Force end-strengths, and in a House report (H.Rept. 110-146) expressed concern over service proposals to retire legacy platforms and transfer certain roles to civilians. The report (S.Rept. 110-335) accompanying the Senate-passed Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (FY2009 NDAA, S. 3001) expressed the Committee’s support for “the Army and Marine Corps efforts to increase their active-duty end strength.” In the late 2010s and early 2020s, as U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan diminished, Congress reduced the Army’s end-strength and increased that of the Navy. Since the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81), Congress has authorized end-strength for the Space Force, whose personnel came largely from the Air Force (See Figure 1). In the report (S.Rept. 118-58) accompanying the Senate Armed Services Committee-reported National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024 NDAA, S. 2226 §401), the committee stated that it chose to recommend lower active end-strength than requested because “legislating unreachable end strength numbers would set the military services up for failure” by “encouraging quantity over quality in recruiting.” It remains unclear whether incremental reductions in previous years may have stemmed in part from this concern. Figure 1. Active Component Authorized End-Strength FY2001-FY2026 Figure is interactive in HTML / Source: CRS analysis of Congress.gov data and President’s Budget Requests—from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for FY2001–FY2026. Notes: FY2001-FY2026 data comprise authorized end-strengths from NDAAs. Space Force end-strength from FY2020 and FY2021 is included in the Air Force line. Coast Guard, part of the Department of Homeland Security, is not shown. FY2026 NDAA The Department of Defense (DOD—which is now “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) increased its FY2026 active-component end-strength request by 26,100 over FY2025 authorized levels. DOD stated that “the Department’s force structure investments support the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance to size and shape the Joint Force under an America First agenda to restore peace through strength.” On December 18, 2025, President Trump signed the FY2026 NDAA into law (P.L. 119-60 ), which enacted the end-strengths outlined in the President’s budget request. This law enacts the end-strengths requested by the Secretary of Defense (see Table 1). Table 1. FY2025 and FY2026 Active-Component End-Strengths Service FY2025 Enacted End-Strength FY2026 President’s Budget Request FY2026 Enacted End-Strength Change from Enacted FY2025-FY2026 Army 442,300 454,000 454,000 +11,700 Navy 332,300 344,600 344,600 +12,300 Air Force 320,000 321,500 321,500 +1,500 Marine Corps 172,300 172,300 172,300 +0 Space Force 9,800 10,400 10,400 +600 Total 1,276,700 1,302,800 1,302,800 +26,100 Sources: Congress.gov; Department of Defense (Department of War), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Coast Guard, part of the Department of Homeland Security, is not shown. Issues for Congress During FY2026, Congress may conduct oversight of the services’ efforts to meet the end-strength targets enacted in the FY2026 NDAA. As Congress considers an FY2027 NDAA, it may assess whether the Executive Branch’s end-strength requests align with Congress’s defense policy objectives. Issues Congress may consider when evaluating future end-strength requests include Do these requests reflect a realistic assessment of the services’ ability to recruit and retain personnel? Do these requests reflect the services’ manpower requirements? Do they address manpower shortages, such as those of the Navy? Do the Navy’s end-strength requests fulfill potential manpower requirements for the “Golden Fleet”? Can the services realistically achieve recruit quality goals while pursuing the requested end-strengths? Do these requests align with service-level force restructuring initiatives, such as those underway in the Army and Marine Corps? Do these requests reflect an optimum active component / reserve component force mix? Do these requests reflect national security priorities, as defined by Congress, the Executive Branch, or both? Do these requests reflect priorities outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), or other documents? Have the services achieved enacted end-strengths in previous years? Does Congress have sufficient information to conduct effective oversight of DOD’s efforts to formulate and achieve end-strength goals? Congress may enact end-strengths that differ from, or are identical to, DOD’s requests.