Presidential Reorganization Authority: Potential Approaches for Congressional Consideration

Between 1932 and 1984, Congress periodically authorized the President to develop plans to reorganize portions of the federal government and to present those plans to Congress. Under most versions of this authority, a submitted plan would be considered under special parliamentary procedures. The President’s plan would go into effect unless one or both houses of Congress passed a resolution rejecting the plan, a process referred to as a “legislative veto.” To the extent this process was used in lieu of lawmaking through the regular legislative procedures in which Congress passes legislation and then presents it to the President for signature or veto, it favored the President’s plan: Absent congressional action, the default was for the plan to go into effect. In contrast to the regular legislative process, the burden of action under these versions of presidential reorganization authority rested with opponents rather than supporters of the plan. In response to the Supreme Court ruling in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha holding a legislative veto to be unconstitutional, the parliamentary procedure mechanism was amended in 1984 to require Congress to affirmatively approve a plan in order for it to go into force. As with the regular legislative process, congressional and presidential affirmation would be needed for a plan to go into effect. However, the special expedited legislative procedures would make plan approval easier than would be the case under the regular process. The most recent version of this authority expired in 1984 and has not been available to the President since then. Before it lapsed, Presidents used this authority regularly, submitting more than 100 plans between 1932 and 1984. Presidents used the authority for a variety of purposes—from relatively minor reorganizations within individual agencies to the creation of large new organizations, including the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1953); the Environmental Protection Agency (1970); and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (1978). The reorganization authority provisions enacted by Congress varied greatly over the 52 years from 1932 and 1984. During some periods, Congress delegated relatively broad authority to the President, while during others the authority was more circumscribed. The current, inoperative authority remains codified in Chapter 9 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Some Presidents have requested, and Congress has periodically considered, reauthorization of this statute. During the 119th Congress, legislation to renew and amend presidential reorganization authority was introduced in the House and Senate. S. 538 was introduced on February 13, 2025, and referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. H.R. 1295, introduced the same day, was considered by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and ordered reported on March 25, 2025. In addition to renewing the authority, the House bill, as ordered reported, would amend the statute to make changes to its purpose, definitions, permissible reorganization plan contents, and limitations on powers. These legislative and committee activities coincided with President Donald Trump’s administrative reorganization and downsizing of the executive branch. There has been support for these efforts among some Members, and a renewal of this authority might make it easier for the Administration to carry out such reorganization and downsizing. Such a renewal might involve certain trade-offs, including, for example, a reduction in congressional control over the federal bureaucracy. The history and evolution of the authority from 1932 to 1984 and the reauthorization proposals put forward since then might inform congressional consideration of current reauthorization legislation and other legislative options. Congress might approach the question of whether, and how, to delegate this authority to the President in various ways. First, Congress could simply elect not to renew the authority either by not acting further on reauthorization legislation or by actively rejecting it. If Congress elects to renew the authority, it might do so without modifications, with the proposed changes to the scope of the authority, with a different set of changes to the scope of the authority, with changes to the nature of the expedited congressional procedures, or with some combination of these.